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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Rosalie Schmechel ("Rosie") suffered an ill-fated death after ingesting lethal 
doses of Methadone and Hydrocodone prescribed to her by treatment providers, Dr. 
Clinton Dille and Thomas Byrne, P.A., from the Southern Idaho Pain Institute. After her 
death, Appellants Vaughn Schmechel, surviving spouse of Rosie, Robert Lewis, Kim 
Howard and Tamara Hall, Rosie's children, (hereinafter collectively referred to as the 
"Schmechels"), filed a Complaint against Clinton Dille, M.D. ("Dr. Dille"), Southern 
Idaho Pain Institute, and Thomas Byrne, P.A. ("Mr. Byrne") on October 3, 2005, for the 
wrongful death of their wife and mother, for the emotional distress suffered as a 
consequence and for their loss of love, support and guidance. (R. Vol. I, pg. 28). The 
parties stipulated to a scheduling order, which set several discovery and motion 
deadlines, including deadlines for expert witness disclosures. (R. Vol. I, pg. 70). Of 
relevance to this appeal is the expert disclosure deadline, which set the deadline for the 
Respondents' experts at 120 days before trial and the Schmechels' rebuttal experts for 90 
days before trial. Id. A jury trial was scheduled and began on October 16, 2007, in Twin 
Falls, Idaho. (R. Vol. I, pg. 73). 
Prior to trial, several Motions in Limine were filed by both parties and were 
heard by the District Court on October 11, 2007, at a pretrial conference. · The District 
Court ruled from the bench on some of the motions and reserved ruling for trial on others. 
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, pgs. 1-114; R. Vol. II, pg. 330). The parties also submitted proposed 
jury instructions and supporting memorandums. Of particular importance to this appeal 
is the Schmechels' proposed instruction and supporting memorandum regarding whether 
the Respondents' conduct rose to the level of"recklessness." (R. Vol. II, pg. 346). 
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During trial, the Schrnechels raised objections concerning evidentiary issues that 
are now the subject of this appeal. Specifically, the Schrnechels assert that the District 
Court erred in three separate rulings related to expert testimony, exclusion of evidence 
and jury instructions. The first ruling concerns the District Court's holding that the 
Schmechels' expert witness was not permitted to offer opinion testimony regarding a 
2003 Delegation of Services Agreement ("DOS Agreement"). The 2003 DOS 
Agreement was the document that defined the duties and responsibilities that Dr. Dille 
delegated to his Physician Assistant, Mr. Byrne. The second ruling concerns the District 
Court's decision to allow Respondents' expert, Dr. James Smith, to testify even after Dr. 
Smith's opinions were not timely disclosed by the Respondents. Finally, the Schmechels 
requested that the District Court admit the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act 
Regulations, IDAP A § 22.01.03 (2003) ("IDAP A Regulations") as an exhibit and 
instruct the Jury as to the standard of care the regulations set forth pertaining to physician 
assistants. The District Court allowed the Schrnechels to publish the IDAPA Regulations 
on an overhead projector for the Jury and allowed the Schmechels to question witnesses 
about the IDAP A Regulations. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, pg 1888-1889). However, the Court did 
not admit them as an exhibit and declined to instruct the Jury as to the standard of care 
for physician assistants in Idaho as set forth in the IDAP A regulations. 
The trial of this matter spanned two weeks, concluding on October 30, 2007, with 
a finding of no negligence. (R. Vol. III, pg. 444). The Schmechels subsequently filed a . 
Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 59 of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure and a 
Memorandum in Support on November 19, 2007. (R. Vol. III, pgs. 453-470). The 
Motion was premised on the three rulings at trial and the Schrnechels' proposed 
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"recklessness instruction." A hearing was held and the Court denied the Schmechels' 
Motion for New Trail on January 23, 2008, in a Memorandum Decision and Order. (R. 
Vol. HI, pgs. 531-545). Judgment was entered for the Respondents on February 14, 
2008. The Schmechels now appeal the District Court's Order denying the Schmechels' 
Motion for a New Trial. The District Court has settled the record for appeal. The clerk's 
certificate of exhibits to the record is set forth at R. Vol. I-III, Supp. R. Vol. I-VII, and 
Trial Tr. Vol. I-II. 1 
1 The Respondents filed a request that the exhibits be included in a supplemental volume of the record. The 
Schmechels did not object to this request, and thus, a Supplemental Record of Exhibits was created, which 
includes Volumes I-Vil. 
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ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1) WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
EXCLUDING EXPERT TESTIMONY CONCERNING THE 2003 
DELEGATION OF SERVICES AGREEMENT WHEN THE RESPONDENTS' 
TARDY PRODUCTION OF THE AGREEMENT CAUSED THE DELAY OF 
THE OPINION DISCLOSURE 
2) WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
ALLOWING DR. JAMES SMITH TO TESTIFY WHEN THE 
RESPONDENTS' UNSEASONABLE DISCLOSURE OF DR. SMITH'S 
OPINIONS SEVERELY PREJUDICED THE SCHMECHELS 
3) WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRONEOUSLY DENIED THE 
SCHMECHELS' REQUEST TO ADMIT THE IDAP A REGULATIONS AND 
ERRONEOUSLY FAILED TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE STANDARD 
OF CARE SET FORTH IN THE IDAPA REGULATIONS WHEN THE 
COURT'S DUTY IS TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THE LAW 
4) WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN BIFURCATING THE 
SCHMECHELS' PROPOSED "RECKLESSNESS INSTRUCTION" AND 
ERRONEOUSLY REMOVED THE ISSUE OF RECKLESSNESS FROM 
THE JURY'S CONSIDERATION 
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Within six days of switching treatment providers for her pain management from 
Kimberly Vorse, M.D. at the Sun Valley Pain and Sleep Center to the Respondents at 
Southern Idaho Pain Institute, Rosalie Schmechel passed away from a lethal prescription 
of Methadone and Hydrocodone. Rosie suffered from ongoing chronic low back pain 
and right leg pain for approximately thirty years. Dr. Vorse was Rosie's treating 
physician for almost 17 years, and by September 16, 2003, Dr. Vorse had diagnosed 
Rosie with lumbar arachnoiditis, severe obstructive sleep apnea, worsening left knee 
osteoarthritis, acute right knee meniscal injury and repair, periodic limb movement 
disorder, hypertension and nasal obstruction, for which surgery was recommended. (Trial 
Tr. Vol. I, pgs. 507-512). In September 2003, Rosie was complaining of worsening low 
back pain and bilateral knee pain and had undergone evaluation by Dr. David Verst, who 
felt continued conservative pain management was indicated. Rosie was prescribed 
Oxycontin by Dr. Verst and Dr. Vorse, along with Lortab, as needed, for her pain. Id. at 
pg. 517. Rosie was and had been on CP AP therapy for her severe obstructive sleep 
apnea since July 2002. 
Rosie was stable on her pain medication regimen under Dr. Vorse's care and 
treatment. Id. at pg. 519. However, because Rosie resided near Twin Falls the distance 
artd winter travel were concerns for her, along with the work her husband missed to drive 
her to appointments. Thus, Rosie decided to undergo treatment at the Southern Idaho 
Pain Institute in Twin Falls. As the testimony from her family and Dr. Vorse revealed, 
Rosie had been under medical care for her pain for a very long time and was a compliant 
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patient during her treatment, following Dr. Vorse's directions very carefully, particularly 
as they pertained to her pain medications. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, pgs. 514-515, 838, 862, 924; 
Vol. II, pgs. 1084, 1156). 
Rosie was first seen at Southern Idaho Pain Institute on September 26, 2003, by 
Dr. Dille's Physician Assistant, Thomas Byrne. Mr. Byrne's assessment for Rosie was 
post-laminectomy/fusion ongoing back pain with minimal radicular symptoms and pain 
management. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, pg. 1288). Mr. Byrne's treatment plan for Rosie was to 
discontinue Oxycontin and start her on Methadone and Hydrocodone. Id., at pg. 1301. 
Rosie was never seen by Dr. Dille. 
However, the handwritten instructions which Mr. Byrne gave to Rosie regarding 
the titration dose of Methadone indicates something different than his typed History and 
Physical of September 26, 2003. While the History and Physical indicates she was to 
start Methadone 10 mg every 12 hours titrated from 5 mg to a maximum of 15 mg over 
the next 72 hours, his handwritten instructions indicate she could take one half to one pill 
every 12 hours and could increase the dosage to a maximum of one and one half pills 
every 12 hours or a total of 30 mg of Methadone with no instruction regarding the time 
period over which this increased dosage was to begin. Id., at 1306-1308. Therefore, 
Rosie could have reasonably believed she was to increase her dosage of Methadone to a 
total of 30 mg per day without regard to the 72 hour period. 
Over the next few days, Rosie called the Southern Idaho Pain Institute and was 
advised to increase the Methadone to 10 mg at bedtime and IO mg in the daytime and to 
follow up if she had problems. Id., at 1310-1319. She was then advised in another 
follow up phone call to titrate the Methadone dose on a variable basis between 10 and 15 
11 
mg in the mornings and evenings. Id., at 1320-21. Mr. Byrne conceded at trial that Dr. 
Dille did not confirm Mr. Byrne's treatment plan and prescription regimen for Rosie and 
that Rosie died without Dr. Dille ever knowing what the dosages of Methadone and 
Hydrocodone were that Mr. Byrne had prescribed for Rosie. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, pg. 792). 
On October 2, 2003, Rosie was pronounced dead from acute combined poisoning of 





STANDARD OF REVIEW ON APPEAL OF A MOTION FOR NEW 
TRIAL 
When considering an appeal from a district court's ruling on a motion for new 
trial, this Court applies the abuse of discretion standard. Cole v. Esquibel, 145 Idaho 652, 
658, 182 P.3d 709, 712 (2008). Griff, Inc. v. Curry Bean Co., Inc., 138 Idaho 315, 322, 
63 P.3d 441, 448 (2003). "To determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, 
this Court considers whether it correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it 
acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with applicable legal 
standards, and whether it reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Reed v. Reed, 
137 Idaho 53, 57, 44 P.3.d 1108, 1112 (2002). This Court exercises free review over 
questions of law and may draw its own conclusions from the evidence in the record. 
Kohring v. Robertson, 137 Id<1ho 94, 98, 44 P.3d 1149, 1153 (2002) (citing, Regjovich v. 
First W Inv., Inc., 134 Idaho 154, 158, 997 P.2d 615 619 (2000); Mut. of Enumclaw v. 
Box, 127 Idaho 851,852,908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995)). 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
ALLOWING DR. LORDON TO TESTIFY REGARDING THE 
DELEGATION OF SERVICES AGREEMENT 
1. The St;mdard of Review for Exclusion of Testimony 
Exclusion of testimony based on late disclosure is a sanction under Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 37(b), and is subject to an abuse of discretion review. McKim v. Horner, 
143 Idaho 568, 571 149 P.3d 843, 846 (2006) (citing, Bramwell v. S. Rigby Canal Co., 
136 Idaho 648,651, 39 P.3d 588, 591 (2001). 
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2. The 2003 Delegation of Services Agreement was not Produced 
to the Schmechels Until the Eve of Trial 
Long before trial of this matter began, the Schmechels deposed Respondents Dr. 
Dille and Mr. Byrne. At Mr. Byrne's deposition, counsel for the Schmechels inquired 
whether there was a Delegation of Services Agreement ("DOS Agreement") between Dr. 
Dille and his physician assistant, Mr. Byrne. (Supp. R. Vol. V, pg. 880). A DOS 
Agreement is a document that was required in 2003 between a physician and his or her 
physician assistant, which establishes the duties and responsibilities of the physician and 
the physician assistant in relation to each other.2 In essence, a DOS Agreement defines 
the responsibilities that a physician delegates to his or her physician assistant. In the 
Schmechels' Amended Notice of Taking Video Deposition Duces Tecum of Thomas 
Byrne, P.A., filed May 1, 2006, the Schmechels specifically requested that Mr. Byrne 
bring any and all DOS Agreements that were in existence between Dr. Dille and Mr. 
Byrne. (Supp. R. Vol. V, pg. 877). When it was asked of Mr. Byrne whether he had 
brought the DOS Agreement with him, counsel for Dr. Dille interjected and stated, 
" ... with regard to the Delegation of Services Agreement, this was not in 
effect in 2003, as the Board of Medicine did not require them in-until 
2004. But we produced the one that was in effect thereafter. And in 
addition to the documents that you have .. .I have the pages that are 
supposed to be attached that go with the 2004 delegation agreement." 
(Supp. R. Vol. V, pg. 880). Counsel for the Schmechels responded, "Okay. So you have 
just handed me three more pages that are the attachment to the Delegation of Services 
Agreement that you're representing was in effect in 2004?" Id. Again, Dr. Dille's 
2 Pursuant to Idaho Code §54-1806(2), the Idaho State Board of Medicine is authorized to promulgate rules 
to govern activities of persons employed as physician assistants by persons licensed to practice medicine in 
Idaho. § 22.01.03.010. 06 (2003) of the Idaho Administrative Procedure Act requires that "A written 
document mutually agreed upon and signed and dated by the physician assistant and the supervising 
physician that defines the working relationship and delegation of duties between the supervising physician 
and the physician assistant as specified by Board rule." 
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attorney confirmed, "Correct." Id. When it was specifically asked of Mr. Byrne whether 
there was a DOS Agreement in effect between Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille in 2003, Mr. 
Byrne responded, "I think there was some documentation that was with the Board of 
Medicine, but not necessarily a Delegation of Services Agreement." Id., at pg. 881. 
The Schmechels also asked the Respondents to produce the 2003 DOS Agreement 
in their First Set of Interrogatories and Requests for Production, sent a year and four 
months before trial began on June 29, 2006 (Supp. R. Vol. V, pgs. 893, 908). The 
Respondents' answer to this request was that the 2003 DOS Agreement between Dr. Dille 
and Mr. Byrne was produced at Mr. Byrne's deposition. (Supp. R. Vol. V, pgs. 916, 938). 
However, the DOS Agreement that was produced at Mr. Byrne's deposition was the 2004 
DOS Agreement, not the 2003 DOS Agreement. Because the events in question occurred 
in 2003, the Schmechels could not have reasonably relied on the 2004 DOS Agreement to 
ascertain the duties and responsibilities that were delegated to Mr. Byrne by Dr. Dille. 
Finally, on October I 0, 2007, six days before trial, Mr. Byrne provided the 
Schmechels with the 2003 DOS Agreement between Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille that was in 
effect at the time of Rosie's death. (Supp. R. Vol. V, pg. 954). Upon review of the 2003 
DOS Agreement, it was revealed to the Schmechels that the 2003 and 2004 DOS 
Agreement were the same. However, the fact that they are the same is largely irrelevant 
because Rosie passed under Mr. Byrne's care in 2003, thus Mr. Byrne's duties and 
responsibilities as a physician assistant in 2004 were completely meaningless. 
At trial, the Schmechels offered the testimony of their expert, Stephen Lordon, 
M.D. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, pgs. 303-388). The Schmechels timely disclosed to the 
Respondents the expert opinions that Dr. Lordon was to offer at trial. (Supp. R. Vol. I, 
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pg. 35). Because the 2003 DOS Agreement was not produced to the Schmechels until six 
days before trial, the Schmechels had no way of allowing Dr. Lordon to review the 2003 
DOS Agreement before his expert disclosures were due to the Respondents. Once Dr. 
Lordon was able to review the 2003 DOS Agreement and form an opinion on how the 
DOS Agreement defined the relationship between Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille, it was 
anticipated Dr. Lordon would testify that according to the 2003 DOS Agreement, Mr. 
Byrne acted outside the scope of the DOS Agreement in prescribing Rosie's medication, 
and thus, breached the standard of care. 
The 2003 DOS Agreement requires Mr. Byrne to make only recommendations of 
a treatment plan to Dr. Dille. (Supp. R. Vol. V, pg. 955). The Agreement also requires 
Dr. Dille to confirm Mr. Byrne's findings and determine a treatment plan. Id. Because 
it was believed that Mr. Byrne determined the treatment plan and medication regimen, 
including the doses of Methadone and Hydrocodone that he prescribed for Rosie on his 
own and without Dr. Dille's confirmation, Dr. Lordon intended to testify that Mr. Byrne 
breached the standard of care in so doing. 
When the Schmechels began questioning Dr. Lordon regarding the 2003 DOS 
Agreement, the Respondents objected on the basis that Dr. Lordon's testimony 
concerning the 2003 DOS Agreement was never disclosed to the Respondents. (Trial Tr. 
Vol. I, pg. 343). The District Court sustained the objection, stating: 
"I determine that, even though it wasn't disclosed until last week, that the 
nature of the inquiry and the circumstances surrounding this testimony 
were known in advance sufficiently to allow this disclosure to have been 
made." 
(Trial Tr. Vol. I, pg. 344). 
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In Southern Idaho Production Credit Association v. Astorquia, 113 Idaho 526, 
746 P.2d 985 (1987), Justice Donaldson wrote a concurring opinion which sheds some 
light onto a trial judge's role in considering discovery violations: 
"The trial judge must balance the equities by comparing the culpability of 
the disobedient party with the resulting prejudice to the innocent party in 
light of the twin aims of the sanction power. Only after applying this 
balancing test, the court should irnpose a sanction which will most 
substantially lead to the efficient administration of justice." 
113 Idaho at 532, 746 P.2d at 991. The record before the Court in this case does not 
reflect a balancing of the equities by the District Court. If the District Court would have 
done so, consideration of the Respondents' conduct in denying that a 2003 DOS 
Agreement existed or that it was not required, should have been given and weighed 
against the prejudicial and detrimental effect that excluding Dr. Lordon's testimony had 
on the Schmechels' ability to present their case. 
As the Idaho Court of Appeals has held, "precluding a litigant from presenting 
evidence on crucial issues prevents a thorough examination of the merits at trial and in 
many circumstances will be tantamount to ordering judgment against the litigant on those 
issues." Roe v. Doe, 129 Idaho 663, 668, 931 P.2d 657, 662 (Ct. App. I 996). Similarly, 
precluding Dr. Lordon's testimony on the 2003 DOS Agreement blocked Dr. Lordon 
from offering his opinion that the 2003 DOS Agreement set forth the relative duties of 
the physician assistant and physician, and that if the Respondents failed to follow the 
DOS Agreement then they violated the standard of care. Not allowing this testimony was 
tantamount to not allowing Dr. Lordon to offer his opinion that Mr. Byrne and Dr. Dille 
breached the standard of care. 
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The Schmechels were, and are, entitled to have the rules complied with and the 
District Court should not be at liberty to ignore the fact that the Respondents failed to 
comply with the rules, having the effect of severely prejudicing the Schmechels and 
preventing their expert from reviewing pertinent documents that would have considerably 
added to his opinions. The Respondents had an obligation to truthfully and diligently 
investigate the answers to the Schmechels' Interrogatories and Requests for Production. 
The Respondents also had an obligation to truthfully and diligently research the existence 
of the 2003 DOS Agreement prior to Mr. Byrne's deposition. Finally, the Respondents 
had an obligation to truthfully and diligently supplement their disclosures and 
misstatements in a seasonable manner. By the ruling to exclude Dr. Lordon's testimony, 
the District Court rewarded the Respondents for their entirely unjustified late disclosure 
of the 2003 DOS Agreement, and abused its discretion in doing so. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
EXCLUDING DR. SMITH'S TESTIMONY 
1. Standard of Review for the Exclusion of Testimony 
Exclusion of testimony based on a late disclosure is governed by Idaho Rule of 
Civil Procedure 37(b), and on appeal, it is subject to an abuse of discretion review. 
McKim v. Horner, 143 Idaho 568, 571 149 P.3d 843 (2006) (citing, Bramwell v. S. Rigby 
Canal Co., 136 Idaho 648, 651, 39 P.3d 588, 591 (2001)). Imposition of this sanction 
rests in the sound discretion of the trial court. 
2. Disclosure of Dr. Smith's Opinions was not Seasonable 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26( e) governs the supplementation of discovery 
responses. Perry v. Magic Valley Medical Center, 134 Idaho 46, 53 995 P.2d 816, 823 
(2000). Rule 26( e )(1) provides, 
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(1) A party is under a duty seasonably to supplement the response 
with respect to any question directly addressed to (A) the identity 
and location of persons having knowledge of discoverable matters, 
and (B) the identity of each person expected to be called as an 
expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which the person is 
expected to testify, and the substance of the person's testimony. 
Rule 26( e )( 4) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure further empowers a trial court to 
exclude testimony offered by a party who fails to timely supplement a response to 
discovery. Smith v. Webber, 97 Idaho 703, 707, 551 P.2d 1339, 1343 (1976). Failure to 
comply with this rule typically results in the proffered evidence being excluded. Radmer 
v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 89, 813 P.2d 897,900 (1991). 
Additionally, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 26(e)(l)(B) requires that litigants 
supplement discovery responses as to "the identity of each person expected to be called 
as an expert witness at trial, the subject matter on which the person is expected to testify, 
and the substance of the person's testimony." Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 874 
136 P.3d 338, 345 (2006). This rule "unambiguously imposes a continuing duty to 
supplement responses to discovery with respect to the substance and subject matter of an 
expert's testimony where the initial responses have been rejected, modified, expanded 
upon or otherwise altered in some manner." Id. (quoting, Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 
Idaho 86, 89 813 P.2d 897, 900 (1991)) (emphasis in Edmunds). Litigants are subject to 
sanctions, including the exclusion of expert testimony, when they have failed to 
supplement an expert's opinion. See, Radmer, 120 Idaho at 91,813 P.2d_at 902. 
Unlike the situation in Edmunds v. Kraner, in which the supplementation of the 
expert's opinion was eight months prior to trial, and the party seeking exclusion of the 
testimony was given sufficient time to undertake additional discovery, the Schmechels in 
this case were afforded no time for additional discovery and no time to research, find and 
19 
prepare a potential rebuttal expert. 142 Idaho 867, 874 136 P)d 338, 345 (2006). As 
stated in Edmunds, "(w)hile a court may properly order parties to disclose expert 
witnesses by a deadline, a brief order dictating the date of disclosing only the names of 
expert witnesses cannot trump the requirement of I.R.C.P. 26(e)(l)(B) that parties 
seasonably supplement their discovery responses as new information is learned or expert 
opinions change." 142 Idaho at 875 136 P.3d at 346 (2006). 
This Court, in McKim v. Horner, upheld a district court's decision to exclude a 
witness based on late disclosure. 143 Idaho 568, 571 149 P.3d 843, 846 (2006). In that 
case, the trial court excluded a witness because the court could not find good cause to 
excuse the failure to disclose her identity within the time required in the scheduling order. 
Id. The trial court also considered that disclosure came twelve days before trial, leaving 
the other party little time to prepare. Id. Moreover, the court considered, if a continuance 
was granted, the prejudiced party faced additional expenses for its witnesses. Id. In 
McKim, just as the Respondents did in this case with Dr. Smith, the plaintiff failed to use 
due diligence to ascertain the opinions of their own expert witness and disclosed the 
witness twelve days before trial. 143 Idaho at 5721, 149 P.3d at 847. Unlike the situation 
in Edmunds, in which the disclosure came eight months before trial, but similar to the 
situation in McKim, in which the disclosure came twelve days before trial, the 
Respondents' supplementation of Dr. Smith's opinions on Rosie's cause of death was far 
from seasonable, a mere eleven days before trial. 
On June 18, 2007, the Respondents disclosed Dr. Smith as an expert and also 
disclosed the opinions that the Respondents anticipated Dr. Smith would offer at trial. 
(Supp. R. Vol. I, pgs 172-173). In their disclosure of Dr. Smith's anticipated opinions, 
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the Respondents did not express that Dr. Smith would offer an opinion as to the cause of 
Rosie's death on a more likely than not basis. In fact, Dr. Smith's initial disclosure stated 
that Dr. Smith "will testify that the cause of Mrs. Schmechel' s death is uncertain and that 
another condition she had was just, if not more, likely to have caused her death than 
Methadone and/or Hydrocodone." (Supp. R. Vol. I, pg. 173). This disclosure is absent of 
any admissible opinions, based on a reasonable degree of probability, of Rosie's cause of 
death. Dr. Smith gave no probable cause opinion in what he believed the cause of death 
to be. It wasn't until October 5, 2007, on the eve of trial, that the Respondents disclosed 
that Dr. Smith was changing his opinion that he would instead testify that the cause of 
Rosie's death was related to a cardiac dysrhythmia. (R. Vol. II, pg. 232). In the 
disclosure, Dr. Smith stated that he was basing this opinion upon two studies he 
reviewed, which were produced to the Schmechels at the same time. Id. 
This new disclosure and new opinion had the effect of capsizing the Schmechels' 
case for two reasons. First, the Schmechels were eleven days away from trial and had no 
time to find a rebuttal witness, depose Dr. Smith, research the credibility of the studies 
and prepare for his testimony. Second, the fact that Dr. Smith had the opinion that 
Rosie's death was related to a cardiac dysrhthmia meant that he was opining that Rosie 
did not die of Methadone and Hydrocodone poisoning, which was the entire foundation 
of the Schmechels' case. 
In a colloquy at trial, the Schmechels moved to preclude Dr. Smith from testifying 
as to Rosie's cause of death. (Trial Tr. Vol. II, pg. 1570). The Court ruled from the 
bench, holding: 
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"I'm going to allow the doctor to testify to his late disclosed opinions, 
based on what I deem to be an extension of the nature of his opinion 
disclosed on June 18th • I recognize it's a late disclosure; but at the same 
token, I am exercising my discretion to allow him to testify to that since 
the issue has been in the case. While its involving studies that were 
disclosed in an untimely fashion as well, I believe that the time between 
the 5th and trial is sufficient to allow counsel to meet those, particularly 
where they haven't been deposing experts in this case." 
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, pg. 1579). 
A trial court contemplating a discovery sanction should request an explanation of 
late disclosure, weigh the importance of the testimony, determine time needed to meet the 
testimony, and consider possibility of a continuance.· Farr v. Mischler, 
129 Idaho 201, 207 923 P.2d 446, 452 (1996) (citing, Viehweg v. Thompson 103 Idaho 
265, 271 647 P.2d 311, 317 (Ct. App. 1982). See also, 8 C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure 327 (1970). 
In this case the District Court did not indicate whether it considered the factors, as 
set forth in Viehweg v. Thompson, 103 Idaho 265, 271 647 P.2d 311, 317 (Ct. App. 
1982), in deciding to allow the testimony. Although addressed by the parties in their 
arguments on the issue, the Court did not address the Respondents' explanation for the 
late disclosure. In addition, the Court did not do · an appropriate weighing of the 
importance of the testimony in question. Dr. Smith's new opinion, that Rosie's cause of 
death was more likely than not due to a cardiac dysrhthmia, uprooted the Schmechels' 
entire theory of their case-that Rosie died of poisoning from Methadone and 
Hydrocodone. Essentially, Dr. Smith attributed cause of death to Rosie's pre-existing 
condition, rather than having no opinion, on a more likely than not basis, as to Rosie's 
cause of death. This opinion likely dramatically impacted how the Jury arrived at cause 
of death, and the District Court made no mention of this incredibly significant factor. 
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The District Court did comment on the second factor, the time needed for 
preparation to meet the testimony, but arrived at an unjust conclusion. (Trial Tr., Vol. II, 
Pg. 1579). In determining that ten days was enough time for the Schmechels to read and 
research treatises, depose Dr. Smith, and secure a rebuttal witness to counter Dr. Smith's 
testimony, the Court imposed a most inequitable measure upon the Schmechels. With 
respect to the final Viehweg factor, because a continuance of the trial was not a plausible 
solution for the Schmechels given the scheduling and expense of their own experts, the 
District Court's schedule and general logistics involved in a complex medical 
malpractice/wrongful death claim, no continuance was sought. 
The Respondents have asserted that the late disclosure of Dr. Smith's testimony 
was in part due to scheduling conflicts with the Schmecheli counsel when making 
efforts to depose the pathologist, Dr. Glen Groben. The Respondents contended that it 
was necessary to depose Dr. Groben so that Dr. Smith could have the benefit of Dr. 
Groben's testimony before forming an opinion on Rosie's cause of death. (Supp. R. Vol. 
VI, pg. 1085). The Respondents also asserted that it was necessary to obtain the 
testimony of the coroner, Ms. Shaiyenne Shindle (Anton) for Dr. Smith to finalize his 
opinion. Again, due to scheduling conflicts with both attorneys for the Schmechels and 
Ms. Shindle, her deposition was not taken until Sept 5, 2007. Based, in part, on Ms. 
Shindle's opinion that Rosie was awake when she died, Dr. Smith subsequently arrived at 
his opinion that Rosie did not die of Methadone and Hydrocodone poisoning, but rather 
of cardiac complications. 
It is important to recognize that the culpability the Respondents place on the 
Schmechels for this late disclosure--i.e., due to the scheduling difficulties of Dr. Groben 
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and Ms. Shindle and counsel for the Schmechels, is immaterial and extraneous. It was 
entirely possible for Dr. Smith to render his cause of death opinion without the testimony 
of Dr. Groben and Ms. Shindle. At the time of Rosie's death, Dr. Groben and Ms. 
Shindle prepared written reports that disclosed the same information regarding Rosie's 
death that was disclosed at their depositions. After reading those reports, which were 
generated before contemplation of a wrongful death claim was even being made, Dr. 
Smith could have formed exactly the same opinion regarding the cause of Rosie's death 
that he did eleven days before trial. The highly deleterious testimony prejudiced the 
Schmechels, likely affected the outcome of the case and should have been excluded. 
The Respondents have further faulted the Schmechels with respect to the late 
disclosure because, as they argue, the Schmechels did not depose Dr. Smith. However, 
the Schmechels elected not to depose Dr. Smith in large part because the Schmechels 
were already in possession of his expert opinion disclosures and were operating with the 
understanding that if Dr. Smith was going to change his opinion as to the cause of death 
then the Schmechels would be so appraised by the Respondents, as is required by Rule 
26(e)(l)(B). Despite the Respondents' fruitless attempts to attribute blame on the 
Schmechels for the late disclosure of Dr. Smith's opinions, in the end, the Respondents' 
disclosure of Dr. Smith's opinions on the eve of trial was far from seasonable, and had a 
profound effect on the Schmechels' case. The District Court's holding in not excluding 
Dr. Smith's testimony is an abuse of discretion and warrants reversal. 
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C. THE ID APA REGULATIONS WERE IMPROPERLY EXCLUDED 
AND THE JURY SHOULD HAVE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE 
STANDARD OF CARE SET FORTH IN THE IDAPA 
REGULATIONS 
1. Standard of Review 
The Supreme Court reviews the trial courts' evidentiary rulings on the abuse of 
discretion standard. Kozlowski v. Rush, 121 Idaho 825, 827, 828 P.2d 854, 856 (1992). 
These include trial court decisions admitting or excluding expert witness testimony, 
Morris By and Through Morris v. Thomson. 130 Idaho 138, 144, 937 P.2d 1212, 1218 
(1997); and excluding evidence on the basis that it is more prejudicial than probative, 
Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 127 Idaho 565, 573, 903 P.2d 730, 738 (1995). To 
determine whether a trial court has abused its discretion, this Court considers whether it 
correctly perceived the issue as discretionary, whether it acted within the boundaries of 
its discretion and consistently with applicable legal standards, and whether it reached its 
decision by an exercise of reason. Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical Center, 
134 Idaho 46, 995 P .2d 8 I 6 (2000). 
The standard of review when reviewing jury instructions on appeal requires this 
Court to determine whether the jury was properly and adequately instructed. Obendorf v. 
Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc.145 Idaho 892, 188 P.3d 834 (2008). Accordingly, on appeal, 
the Court "review(s) the instructions and ascertains whether the instructions, when 
considered as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the applicable 
law." Id. (citing, Ricketis v. Eastern Idaho Equip., Co., Inc., 137 Idaho 578,581, 51 P.3d 
392, 395 (2002). The question whether a duty exists is a question of law, over which an 
appeals court exercises free review. Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389, 34 P.3d 
I 069, 1072 (2001 ). "Negligence per se, which results from the violation of a specific 
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requirement of law or ordinance, is a question of law, over which this Court exercises 
free review." O'Guin v. Bingham County, 142 Idaho 49, 51, 122 P.3d 308,310 (2005). 
2. The ID APA Regulations on the Scope and Practice of a Physician 
Assistant Clearly Define the Standard of Care for Physician 
Assistants in Idaho 
A party is not required to separately plead negligence per se as a theory distinct 
from ordinary negligence. Obendorfv. Terra Hug Spray Co., Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 897 
188 P.3d 834, 839 (2008). "(I)n Idaho, it is well established that statutes and 
administrative regulations may define the applicable standard of care owed, and that 
violations of such statutes and regulations may constitute negligence per se." Sanchez v. 
Galey, 112 Idaho 609, 617, 733 P.2d 1234, 1242 (1986). When a duty of care is defined 
by a statute or regulation, (l) the statute or regulation must clearly define the required 
standard of conduct; (2) the statute or regulation must have been intended to prevent the 
type of harm the defendant's act or omission caused; (3) the plaintiff must be a member 
of the class of persons the statute or regulation was designed to protect; and ( 4) the 
violation must have been the proximate cause of the injury. Obendo(f v. Terra Hug 
Spray Co. Inc., 145 Idaho 892, 899, 188 P.3d 834, 841 (2008) (citing, O'Guin, 142 Idaho 
at 52, 122 P.3d at 311). 
As in Obenddorf, in which the statute, I.C. §§ 22-3420 (l) and (2) clearly define 
a standard or conduct with respect to pesticides, IDAPA § 22.01.03.000 (2003) provides 
an unambiguous description of the required standard of conduct for a physician assistant 
in Idaho. The ID APA regulations distinctly set forth the required standard of conduct for 
physician assistants, as they were designed to "govern the activities of persons employed 
as physician assistants by persons licensed to practice medicine and surgery or 
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osteopathic medicine and surgery in Idaho." IDAPA 22.01.03.000 (2003). IDAPA § 
22.01.03.030.03 (2003) provides the following for the "Practice Standards of Physician 
Assistants in Idaho: "A physician assistant shall not write prescriptions ... diagnose and 
manage major illnesses or conditions or manage the health care of unstable or acutely ill 
or injured patients unless those conditions are minor." § 22.01.03 .028. also defines and 
limits the "SCOPE OF PRACTICE" for a physician assistant in Idaho by detailing, in 
eight separate sections, the bounds within which a physician assistant may practice. The 
fourth section of the SCOPE OF PRACTICE specifically provides that a physician 
assistant may "manage care" of a patient and in so doing: "manage(s) the health care of 
the stable chronically ill patient in accordance with the medical regimen initiated by the 
supervising physician." IDAPA § 22.01.03.030.04 (2003). 
The Respondents assert that the terms "minor illness" and "manage" are not 
clearly defined within the regulations, and in turn, the duty of a physician assistant is not 
clearly defined. (Supp. R. Vol. VI, pg. 1089). This argument must fail, for if the 
argument were to prevail, then a negligence per se instruction would never be appropriate 
because every term in the regulation or statute would necessitate a definition. In a sense, 
the courts would have to define the definition. For example, in Sanchez v. Galey, the trial 
court used the following instructions based on OSHA regulations: 
"At the time of their initial employment and at least annually thereafter the 
employer shall instruct every employee in the safe operation and servicing 
of all equipment with which the employee will be involved, and at least 
the following safe operating practices should be covered: 1. stop engine, 
disconnect the power source and wait for all machine movement to stop 
before cleaning or unclogging the equipment; 2. make sure everyone is 
clear of the machine before starting the engine, engaging power or 
operating the machine." 29 C.F.R. § 1928.57(6). 
27 
l 12 Idaho at 616, 733 P.2d at 1241. The regulation and corresponding instruction does 
not define what "safe operation" of the equipment is, yet the Court in Sanchez determined 
that the regulation clearly defined the standard of care. If every word in a regulation had 
to be lucidly defined for the regulation to formulate a standard of care, then utilizing 
regulations to instruct juries on the law would be an implausible endeavor. In this case, 
the Jury was entirely competent to decipher the difference between a minor illness and a 
major illness and is also entirely capable of deciding what "manage" means, just as the 
jury in Sanchez v. Galey was capable of determining what "safe operation" means. These. 
rudimentary terms certainly should not prevent a trial court from fulfilling its obligation 
to instruct the jury on the law. 
Moreover, on cross examination Mr. Byrne admitted that the IDAPA regulations 
were the law that governed the duties of a physician assistant. (Trial. Tr. Vol. II, pg. 
1346). He further admitted that the regulations required a Delegation of Services 
Agreement and that if he did not practice within the bounds of the agreement that he fell 
below the standard of care. Id., at pgs. 1346-1347. Mr. Byrne, by his own testimony, 
stated that he was treating Rosie for a "minor illness." (Trial Tr. Vol. II, pg. 1364). 
Therefore, Mr. Byrne informed the Jury himself what he believed a "minor illness" was, 
and after hearing testimony regarding the extent of Rosie's illness, the Jury could 
determine for itself what constituted a "minor illness" under the IDAP A regulations. 
The Schmechels dispute that Mr. Byrne was, in fact, treating Rosie for a "minor 
illness." Rather, as reflected in testimony from Dr. Kimberly Vorse, Rosie was a very 
complex patient for which a physician assistant is not authorized, pursuant to the IDAPA 
regulations, to treat. (See, Trial Tr. Vol. I, pg. 508). However, the Schmechels' theory 
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that Rosie was a complex patient does not detract from the contention that a Jury can 
ascertain what the meaning of "minor" is and that no definition of "minor" is necessary 
for the trial court to have given the negligence per se instruction. It is within the province 
of the Jury to decide whether in so doing, Mr. Byrne exceeded what, by law, the scope of 
his practice entitles him to do. 
3. The District Court Improperly Took "Judicial Notice" of the ID APA 
Regulations 
At the time of the jury instructions conference, the Schmechels offered a 
proposed jury instruction outlining the standard of care set forth in the IDAPA 
regulations. (R. Vol. II, pg. 338). The District Court issued its ruling that it would not 
admit the regulations and would not give the Schmechels' proposed instruction. (Trial Tr. 
Vol. II, pgs. 1888-1889). On the issue of the IDAPA Regulations, the Court stated, 
"I'm certainly, under Rule 20l(g), entitled to take notice of adjudicative 
facts and then instruct the jury that those are established as fact. Now, 
certainly, I can take judicial notice that Idaho has and in 2003 had and 
IDAPA section ... that governed medical providers, and they've been 
offered as Plaintiffs 39 ... But it seems to me where I'm hanging up here is 
the rules themselves are matters, and witnesses have talked about the Jaw 
in Idaho. Counsel's questions relative to them on both sides have talked 
about, are you aware of the law in Idaho ... I can take notice of the fact that 
they exist. Beyond that then, what do we do with them, I guess, is the next 
question, and in what form would the jury be given them to wrestle with 
the standard of care, how do these rules play into that, if they need them to 
refresh their memory on what witnesses testified as to what the law 
requires." 
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, pgs. 1851-1853). 
The District Court went on to cite to Perry v. Magic Valley Regional Medical 
Center, in which the trial court took judicial notice as conclusive fact the mortality tables, 
and State v. Howell, in which the Idaho Court of Appeals stated, "we are empowered to 
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take judicial notice of these rules and regulations." 122 Idaho 209, 213, 832 P.2d 1144, 
1148 (Ct. App. 1992). 
Then the District Court asked the question, once judicial notice is taken of the 
regulations, what does the Court and Jury do with them? (Trial Tr. Vol. II, pg. 1853). 
Thus, by the Court's own concession, the fact that the Court takes judicial notice of the 
IDAPA regulations has no meaning and effect for the Jury. The only thing the Jury can 
do with that information is presume that it was the Trial Judge's responsibility to apply 
and use the regulations in an endeavor that the Judge would undertake without the Jury. 
By taking judicial notice, the ID APA regulations became a hollow document to the Jury 
and all of the testimony presented regarding the regulations became futile. 
The taking of "Judicial Notice" in a jury instruction in Perry v. Magic Valley is 
very different than the situation and fashion in which the Court took judicial notice in the 
present case. In Perry v. Magic Valley, the court took judicial notice of mortality tables 
and the instruction stated the following: 
"If you find that plaintiff is entitled to recover damages, you may 
consider along with the other evidence, the fact that under a standard table 
of mortality, of which we take notice without proof and which is to be 
taken as evidence in this case, the life expectancy of a female, age 31, is 
50 years .... [T]his date may be considered by you in connection with all 
other evidence relating to the probable life expectancy of the individual 
here in question, including her occupation, health, habits, and other 
activities." 
134 Idaho 46, 59, 995 P.2d 816, 829 (2000). In Perry, the Court actually spelled out for 
the jury what it was taking judicial notice of-i.e, that the life expectancy of a 31 year old 
female is 50 years. Thus, the jury was to accept as a fact that the life expectancy of a 31 
year old female was 50 years. In the present case, the District Court merely took judicial 
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notice that the IDAP A regulations existed. The instruction in this case (Instruction No. 
28) reads: 
"You are instructed that the court takes judicial notice of the Idaho 
Administrative Procedures Act, § 22.02.03 (2003), entitled "Rules for the 
Licensure of Physician Assistants." The rules were in effect in 2003." 
(R. Vol. II, pg. 426). This instruction had no significance to the Jury because the District 
Court did not associate any sort of meaning to the IDAPA Regulations. The effect of this 
instruction is precisely the same effect that no instruction at all regarding the IDAP A 
regulations would have had upon the Jury. This, in tum, makes all of the testimony and 
evidence the Jury heard on the IDAPA regulations irrelevant. 
The case of State v. Howell, cited by the District Court, offers no further guidance 
on the issue. In that case, it was the Appellate Court, not the trial court, taking judicial 
notice of regulations. 122 Idaho 209, 213, 832 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Ct. App. 1992). The 
effect of the Court of Appeals taking judicial notice of the regulations had no bearing on 
the trial court's duty to instruct the jury on the law. 
The Respondents asserted in their Memorandum in Opposition for New Trial that 
it was harmless error to not instruct the Jury on the IDAPA regulations because the 
Schmechels were allowed to publish the regulations to the Jury on the overhead projector 
during trial and cross examine the Respondents regarding the 2003 IDAP A regulations. 
(Supp. R. Vol. VI, pg. 1087). However, what this fails to account for is that, "A 
negligence per se instruction transforms the character of the fact finder's inquiry. The 
applicable standard of care is affected by such an instruction." Sanchez v. Galey, 1243, 
618 (citing, Wendland v. Ridgefield Construction Services, Inc., 184 Corm. 173,439 A.2d 
954 (1981 )). Additionally, because the IDAP A instructions were given no meaning in 
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Instruction No. 28, the testimony and evidence regarding the IDAPA instructions was 
entirely meaningless to the Jury. 
4. The IDAP A Regulations Governing Physician Assistants in 
Idaho were Promulgated in the Interest of Patient Safety 
With respect to the second prong of the Sanchez v. Galey and O 'Guin v. Bingham 
County requirements for a negligence per se instruction, the IDAP A rules and regulations 
are in place to safeguard the public, and thus, Rosie was precisely the type of patient that 
the Board of Medicine intended to protect in the promulgation of those rules. Pursuant to 
Idaho Code §54-1806(2), the Idaho State Board of Medicine was authorized to 
promulgate rules to govern activities of persons employed as physician assistants by 
persons licensed to practice medicine in Idaho. The purpose of creating rules to govern 
physician assistants in Idaho was to ensure that physician assistants do not exceed the 
scope of their education and training in the practice of medicine, and consequently 
compromise patient safety. 
The District Court's finding that the IDAPA regulations were not admissible is 
inconsistent with the State of Idaho Legislature's action in authorizing the Board of 
Medicine to promulgate the ID APA regulations that govern the conduct of a physician 
assistant. The Idaho Legislature's clear intent in granting this authority and the Board of 
Medicine's rationale for imposing this duty and defining the scope of practice for 
physician assistants is to ensure that physicians assistants such as Mr. Byrne do not 
transgress their bounds of authority to practice medicine. The IDAP A regulations were 
created to prevent precisely the type of harm that transpired with Rosie, ultimately 
causing her death. 
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D. THE JURY SHOULD HA VE BEEN INSTRUCTED ON THE ISSUE 
OF RECKLESSNESS 
1. Standard of Review 
When reviewing jury instructions on appeal, the appellate court must decide 
whether the instructions, considered as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues 
and state the applicable law. Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 462 886 P.2d 
330, 338 (1994). Reversible error occurs when an instruction misleads the jury or 
prejudices a party. Id. (citing, Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 122 Idaho 47, 
830 P.2d 1185 (1992)). It is for this Court to decide whether the jury instructions of the 
trial court, as a whole, fairly and adequately present the issues and state the law. VFP VC 
v. Dakota Co., 141 Idaho 326, 109 P.3d 714 (2005); Silver Creek Computers, Inc. v. 
Petra, Inc., 136 Idaho 879, 882, 42 P.3d 672, 675 (2002). Reversible error occurs when 
an instruction misleads the jury or prejudices a party. Howell v. Eastern Idaho R.R., Inc., 
135 Idaho 733, 740, 24 P.3d 50, 57 (2001). 
2. Removing the "Reckless" Instruction Unfairly Detached 
the Issues and Evidence Presented to the Jury 
A trial court has a duty to instruct a Jury on a litigant's theories and defenses 
which find any support in the evidence, and the facts must be construed most favorably to 
the party requesting the instruction. Spence v. Howell, 126 Idaho 763, 769, 890 P.2d 714, 
720 (1995) (citing, Rosenberg v. Toetly, 94 Idaho 413, 420, 489 P.2d 446, 453 (1971)). 
Failure to submit a party's defenses and theories to the jury is reversible error. Garrett 
Freightlines, Inc. v. Bannock Paving Co., 112 Idaho 722, 731, 735 P.2d 1033, 1042 
(1987). In the present case, the Schmechels presented considerable testimony that the 
Respondents' conduct was reckless through Plaintiffs' expert, Dr. Arthur Lipman. 
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Moreover, the District Court's decision to bifurcate the issues was tantamount to 
the Court commenting on the evidence. The Court was deciding on its own, rather than 
allowing the Jury to decide, that based on the evidence presented at trial, the 
Respondents' conduct did not rise to the level of recklessness. The Court articulated at 
trial, 
"First of all, in granting the request to bifurcate the reckless issue, I 
recognize that in a typical case, whatever that may be, that recklessness is 
something that's put on the verdict form initially arid talking about in 
closing. The Newberry versus Martens was such a case for me that I'm 
going to talk about under proximate cause issues. But I've gone back and 
reviewed Dr. Lipman's testimony. I've reviewed the standard of proof 
that's required for that; and my conclusion is that the issue of recklessness 
should be addressed if and when the jury makes it necessary for us to do 
so .... I see no prejudice to the parties, although certainly the ability as a 
plaintiffs counsel to argue recklessness falling back to a negligence 
position is certain one that I would prefer if I were in Mr. Foster or Mr. 
Comstock's chair. I feel that the overall fairness of the circumstances 
does not negate my desire to leave that for the jury." 
(Trial Tr. Vol. II, pgs. 1883-1884). The District Court gave this ruling just before 
closing arguments. The palpable difficulty this imposed on the Schmechels was that the 
Schmechels presented testimony and evidence on the issue of recklessness without ever 
knowing that the District Court was going to take the issue away from the Jury. 
Because the Court removed the "reckless" instruction, the Schmechels were 
hindered in their.ability to argue to the jury the extent to which the Respondents' conduct 
was below the standard of care. It was impossible for the Jury to apply the evidence 
presented at trial that the Respondents were reckless when it was not specifically 
instructed as to what the meaning of "reckless" was. 
Perhaps an appropriate analogy to this issue is found in the criminal law context. 
Often, trial judges must decide whether a "lesser included" offense should be 
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incorporated into the jury instructions. In that setting, the trial judge is directed to 
instruct.the jury with respect to a lesser included offense if: (1) Either party requests such 
an instruction; and (2) There is a reasonable view of the evidence presented in the ,case 
that would support a finding that the defendant committed such lesser included offense 
but did not commit the greater offense. State v. Rae, 139 Idaho 650, 653, 84 P.3d 586, 
589 (Ct. App. 2004). An instruction on a lesser included offense is mandatory if a 
reasonable view of the evidence would support the instruction. LC. § 19-2132. 
Essentially, the trial judge is mandated to instruct a jury on the charge contained within 
the prosecutor's information and if the evidence at trial warrants a giving of a lesser 
included offense then the judge is to include the lesser charge in the instructions. 
Precisely the opposite situation transpired in the present case. The District Court 
instructed the Jury on the "lesser included" claim of negligence and even though the 
evidence warranted an instruction on recklessness, an original claim in the Schmechels' 
Complaint, the Judge left it out of the instructions. Similar to the criminal context, the 
District Court should have given an instruction on recklessness because a reasonable 
view of the facts would have supported a finding that Mr. Byrne knew or should have 
known that his prescription and titration doses of Methadone and Hydrocodone for Rosie 
would have caused her serious harm. 
The Respondents have asserted that it makes no difference whether the Jury was 
given a "reckless" instruction or not because the Jury determined that the Respondents 
were not negligent. (Supp. R. Vol. VI, pg. 1093). In other words, the Respondents 
contend, in order for conduct to rise to the level of being reckless, it is axiomatic that the 
conduct must also be negligent. What this argument fails to account for is that the Jury is 
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naYve to the difference. While attorneys and judges easily recognize that negligence 
constitutes a lesser degree of harmful conduct than recklessness, juries can just as easily 
perceive them to be two very different characterizations of conduct. This is especially 
true in the instant matter, where the Jury was presented with testimony on whether the 
Respondents were negligent and whether the Respondents were reckless. It is entirely 
possible that in the minds of the Jury, the Respondents were reckless, but they were not 
negligent. However, because they were not instructed on the issue of recklessness, they 
were deprived of making the distinction for themselves. 
The effect of taking the "reckless" issue out of the Jury's consideration is 
equivalent to forcing the Jury to disregard relevant evidence presented during trial. The 
significance of the term "reckless" was embedded in the minds of the jurors by the 
conclusion of trial. In bifurcating the negligence and recklessness instructions, the 
District Court created a situation in which the Jury was left confounded. The Jury heard 
testimony that the Respondents' conduct constituted reckless behavior, but when they 
were left to deliberate, all of the testimony about recklessness lost its meaning because 
they were not instructed on how to apply the meaning of recklessness to the facts of the 
case. 
The Jury might have, based on the testimony from Dr. Lipman, arrived at the 
conclusion that Mr. Byrne's conduct in particular constituted recklessness. The Jury was 
told by Dr. Lipman that Mr. Byrne "knew or should have known" that his acts or 
omissions in Mr. Byrne's care and treatment of Rosie created an unreasonable risk of 
harm to her. (Trial Tr. Vol. I, pgs. 665-669). Whether Mr. Byrne "knew or should have 
known" is a different standard than the ordinary negligence standard of "failing to meet 
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the standard of care," as is reflected in Instruction 22. (R. Vol. III, pg. 420). If it is the 
Jury's job to apply the facts, testimony and evidence of the case to the law, then the Jury 
should be the entity to resolve whether Mr. Byrne's conduct was reckless, not the Trial 
Judge. The instructions as a whole did not reflect the testimony and evidence presented 
at trial and did not adequately state the Jaw of the case. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the Schmechels respectfully request this Court to 
reverse the District Court's denial of the Schmechels' Motion for a New Trial. The 
Schmechels request this Court to reverse the District Court's rulings 1) excluding Dr. 
Lordon's testimony regarding the 2003 DOS Agreement, 2) allowing Dr. Smith's 
testimony regarding Rosie's cause of death, 3) not admitting the IDAPA regulations and 
not instructing the Jury as to the standard of care provided for in the IDAP A regulations, 
and 4) failing to instruct the Jury on the issue of recklessness. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED, This 6th day of November, 2008. 
COMSTOCK & BUSH 
~ 
ssman, Of the Firm 
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